Emulating Success: The Royals, Twins and the Small-Market Formula

I'll start off with a house-keeping item...I'd like to officially welcome Bryan Chapman as a writer to this blog. Bryan grew up in Kansas City and has been a Royals fan throughout his life. He'll be writing about mostly Royals and Cubs-related things (he’s a Cubs season-ticket holder) as well as other general baseball topics as we try to get this blog rolling again. We might have a 3rd writer coming on soon (another Twins fan) but Bryan and I are still in the process of applying peer-pressure so we'll let you know what happens.

Since this blog is now a Twins/Royals blog, I thought I would start by comparing the two teams and seeing if my beloved Twins might share some things in common with the Royals. Major League Baseball is very much a league of copycats and I think, in many ways, the Twins are following a very similar path to success that the Royals have just completed. The Royals and Dayton Moore, it can be argued, were simply following a formula for small-market MLB success that was pioneered by the Marlins and Rays (and the Twins, to an extent).

In 1993 the Florida Marlins were created as part of an expansion move by Major League Baseball. Their first 4 seasons were all losing seasons and then suddenly, in 1997, the Marlins broke through and won it all. After winning the 1997 World Series, they immediately dismantled the team, lost 108 games in 1998 and started building again. All told, they had 5 straight losing seasons before winning it all again in 2003. They never spent a lot of money and created a model based on building from within and then adding key free agent pieces when the homegrown talent started to appear at the Major League level. The Tampa Bay Rays have a very similar story - they were an expansion franchise in 1998, and lost 90+ games for 10 straight seasons before breaking through and making it to the World Series in 2007 (which they lost). The Marlins and the Rays were the modern blueprint of building via the Draft and then making small free agency splashes when the time was right.

The Royals are a much more storied franchise than either the Marlins or the Rays - they were an expansion team in 1969 and had a stretch from the mid-70s to the mid-80s where they were perennial contenders. From 1975 to 1985, they finished either 1st or 2nd in their division in 10 out of 11 seasons. The rest of the story has been repeated ad nauseam over the past 6 weeks as the Royals finally broke a 29-year stretch of non-playoff baseball, went on a somewhat miraculous run through the playoffs, and made it all the way to the World Series. The story, however, starts with a change at the GM position in 2006 - when the Royals brought Dayton Moore in to help turn the franchise around.

Dayton Moore cut his teeth as a scout for the Atlanta Braves and eventually worked his way up to Director of Player Personnel Development before leaving the Braves for the GM post with the Royals. Since 2006, Moore has become been quite a controversial figure among Royals fans and is seen as a middle-of-the-road GM around the rest of baseball. He doesn't command the respect of a Billy Beane or Theo Epstein as many of his moves over the past several years have been questioned, but he's also put together a fairly young and very exciting team that could be a contender for several years. He's done it using the blueprint that the Marlins and Rays forged in the late-90s and early 2000s. The primary difference between him and his predecessor in Kansas City, Allard Baird, has been in their approach to player development. I wasn't a rabid baseball fan in the early-2000s when Baird was around, but in looking at the moves he made, it appears he viewed young talent as trading pieces to land bigger groups of young-ish talent, most notably trading away budding stars like Damon and Beltran in multi-team, multi-player deals.

Moore inherited a team that had some decent pieces in the farm system including Alex Gordon and Billy Butler and they had a mentally-shaky Zack Greinke who was just getting started in the Majors. Moore immediately set about stocking the shelves of the farm system and within 3 years he had a farm system full of players that are now on the Major League roster: Greg Holland (2007), Danny Duffy (2007), Mike Moustakas (2007), Eric Hosmer (2008), Yordano Ventura (International Signing 2008), Salvador Perez (International signing 2006), Jarrod Dyson (2006) and Wil Myers (2009). In 2009, he traded away Greinke and received Lorenzo Cain, Alcides Escobar, Jeremy Jeffress, and Jake Odorizzi. As some of that talent started to reach the Majors, Moore started to add free agents here and there without losing many of the pieces that the Royals had developed. He traded away Myers and Odorizzi to land James "Big Game" Shields and Wade Davis (both integral cogs of the 2014 team) and also added Norichika Aoki, Jeremy Guthrie and Omar Infante. He followed the recipe perfectly – building from within and then adding the missing pieces via trades and free-agency when the window started to open.

So where do the Twins fit into all of this and, if they are indeed following the same formula, where are they in the process?

I mentioned in my opening that the Twins were one of those teams that, along with the Marlins and Rays, helped to blaze a path to winning baseball for small-market teams. All of us remember 2002-2010 and how great it was to see the Twins become a year-in, year-out contender. That success, however, was built on a pile of losing seasons which allowed the Twins to gather some blue-chip prospects like Joe Mauer, Justin Morneau, Johan Santana, Torii Hunter, and Michael Cuddyer. The Twins brass ended up being more lucky than skilled as all of those aforementioned players arrived in the Majors at about the same time, setting the stage for several years of winning baseball in Minnesota.

Since 2010, this team has been one of the worst in baseball – there are no two ways about it. The losing, however, hasn’t been without its benefits as the Twins have been able to build a fairly powerhouse farm system that features some of the best prospects in baseball. Byron Buxton and Miguel Sano are at the top of the class, but the Twins have a bevy of talent in the middle rungs of the organization depth chart that could be sniffing the Majors within 1-3 years. The Twins had five of Baseball America’s Midseason Top 50 Prospects and have the top ranked farm system in the Majors according to Baseball Prospectus. The Twins are essentially in the same position the Royals were about 5 years ago…a stable full of talent that they are waiting for.

It seems obvious that the Twins are at least attempting to follow the template for success that has been utilized by other similar small market teams. In fact, it could be argued that if you, as a small-market team owner, are not willing to spend a lot of money on payroll, your only real chance to compete is using the model that was pioneered by the Marlins and Rays. The Twins have taken advantage of their losing ways by filling their Minor League talent pipeline. Over the last few seasons, they have also cut their payroll down quite a bit, from $113MM in 2011 to $85.5MM in 2014 (and even less in 2015), which should give them some room to dabble in free-agency once some of these prospects start to burst onto the scene. It remains to be seen whether the Twins will actually open up the pocket book when the time comes, but that’s another blog post altogether.

The question for the Twins, and that the Royals had even as recently as earlier this year is, “will this all pan out?” Sano missed most of this past season after undergoing Tommy John surgery. Buxton hasn’t been able to stay healthy at all and had recent surgery that ended his Arizona Fall League season. Some of the talent that we have started to see with the Major League club, most notably Trevor May, has struggled mightily. Other unexpected call-ups have been quite impressive (Danny Santana, Kennys Vargas). There are some young arms in the system that seem to hold a lot of promise but that are still in Single-A and Double-A (Jose Berrios and Kohl Stewart). There are some Triple-A arms that have lost some of the luster as time has passed (the aforementioned May and his former battery-mate Alex Meyer). In summary, there are a lot of question marks and no quick answers. This team, at a minimum, is still at least two years away from being competitive and probably at least 3-4 years away from being a playoff contender. That seems like a long time but when this is the model you’re following, patience (and some luck) is necessary.

One thing that will be interesting to watch with the Royals going forward is seeing how they handle the free agency of their own players. Many of their core players (Hosmer, Moustakas, Cain, Holland) are still under team control for a few years, but James Shields and Billy Butler are free agents this off-season and Alex Gordon will be a free-agent next season. Will the Royals try and re-sign either Butler or Shields? Will they pony-up to keep some of these other core players on the team, or will they try and trade them away to see what they can get to keep their farm system stocked? It’s the ultimate dilemma in the small-market success formula. Spend to try and keep the winning window open awhile longer, or trade away valuable pieces for more young talent and another chance to catch lightening in a bottle…

Small Ball for All? Not So Fast, My Friend.

During the last week of October, the national conversation included phrases such as “Gas House Gang” and “small ball.”  This was in reference to the Kansas City Royals’ improbable run to a Game 7 of the World Series, and the means by which they did so.  The strengths of the Royals this year was its bullpen, its defense, aggressiveness on the base paths and the fact that they are tough to strike out. (Not necessarily in that order.) But do the last two actually matter?  Well, of course the matter on some level.  But do teams that successfully steal significantly more bases than the rest win more games?  Do teams that make contact at the plate stand a better chance to make the playoffs in the Wild-Card era? 

Over at Bill James Online, Dave Fleming has an interesting piece on the relative importance of “contact,” i.e., low strikeout totals and “steals” to the Kansas City Royals season.  It should be noted that Fleming’s piece was written the night the Royals advanced to the ALCS, so Fleming does not take into account the performance of the Royals in their sweep of the Orioles, or the World Series.  Fleming concludes that while the Royals as a team are in fact a rarity with a low strikeout/high stolen base combination, in and of itself, such statistics are not good indicators of regular season success. 

Fleming notes that the Royals struck out at lowest rate in the Majors this year, 985 times, while the MLB average was 1246.  The Cubs led the league with 1477 strikeouts.  It turns out the Royals led the league “contact” in 2012 and 2013 as well, with league leading strike out totals of 1032 and 1048, respectively.  In short, the 2014 Royals increased their contact rate in 2014.  Pretty impressive.  But does it matter?  The Royals won 89 games during the regular season, and the Cubs won 73 games.  So yes, clearly contact-prone teams are more likely to win, right?

Wrong. According to Fleming, (and his statistics bear this out) during the Wild-Card era, teams with the lowest strikeout totals in season have a winning percentage barely above .500, and that is only due to the amazing Cleveland Indians teams of 1995 and 1996.   In short, the evidence suggests that a team with a low strikeout rate does not stand to win more games as a result. 

Ok, well, what about the Royals speed?  “That’s what speed do,” right? Win games?  Well, the Royals stole 153 bases this year, while the MLB average was 92.  But historically, as Fleming points out, the Royals are not exceptional in this regard.  During the Wild-Card era, the Royals are basically middle of the pack when it comes to number of stolen bases vs. the MLB average.   For example, the 2007 Mets stole 200 bases in a year where the MLB average was 97 steals per team.  Remember the 2007 Mets?  Me neither.

But here’s where Fleming’s analysis gets interesting (from a Royals fan perspective).  Fleming notes that the 2014 Royals are historic, in that no team in the Wild-Card era “has managed to avoid strikeouts and steal bases to the degree that the 2014 Royals have.”  And, the top eight teams with the highest relative difference (compared to the MLB average) on strikeouts and stolen basis averaged 91 wins a season, with the 2014 Royals leading the way. 

In sum, I take from Fleming’s piece that being a high-contact/high stolen base team is not a winning strategy in and of itself.  On average, teams which have excelled in these categories over the last 20 year play a little better than .500 ball, but some lose 90 games.  That said, Fleming’s piece suggests that after a certain point, however, it can matter.  If a team’s combined relative difference in these categories is exceptional, then perhaps it is reasonable to expect something north of 85 wins. 

Based on the above, I’ll paraphrase the great James Carville: It’s (likely) the bullpen, stupid.

That's What Speed (Almost) Do

This post was written by my good friend Bryan who is a very avid Royals fan. He approached me last week after the World Series concluded and his perspective on the 9th inning of last week's Game 7 is unique. Without further ado...

 

By: Bryan Chapman (you can follow him on twitter @bscjd31)

"Last Wednesday night the Kansas City Royals lost game seven of the World Series to the San Francisco Giants 3-2.  If you are reading this blog, you already know that Madison Bumgarner took the opportunity that night to vault from merely "dominant postseason pitcher" to perhaps "the best postseason pitcher ever."  Bumgarner pitched five scoreless (and almost flawless) innings Wednesday night after throwing 117 pitches the previous Sunday night, which resulted in a complete game shutout.  For some perspective, Bumgarner pitched over 21 innings in the World Series, and the rest of the Giants' starting rotation combined pitched 17.  Despite throwing 21 innings, Bumgarner's World Series ERA ended up less than 0.50.  Wow.  

But while Bumgarner appeared to be cruising towards his third World Series ring in five years, a funny thing happened with two outs in the bottom of the ninth inning. Alex Gordon lined what appeared to be a routine single to centerfield off of Bumgarner, but Gregor Blanco of the Giants misplayed the bounce in centerfield, and the ball rolled all the way to the fence.  Gordon ended up on third with a standup triple. Suddenly, the Royals were 90 feet away from a startling and improbable comeback.  Some, like Nate Silver at the Five-Thirty Eight maintain that Gordon should have tried to score, given the small chance the next batter would have also safely reached base off of Bumgarner.  Others, like Joe Posnanski of NBC Sports, think Gordon would have been out by a ten feet or more.  It's a counterfactual and we'll never know.  What we do know is that the next batter, Royals catcher Salvador Perez, insisted on swinging at multiple pitches out of the strike zone, ending his at bat with a pop-out to Giants third baseman Pablo Sandoval in foul territory ending not only the game, but the World Series and my beloved Royals' dream season.  Such is life.

If baseball is no longer the national pastime, second guessing Royals manager Ned Yost may have taken its place.  Yost's love of bunting, stolen bases constant lineup maneuvers have frustrated almost all Royals fans at some point, and left Bill Simmons of Grantland, the notorious Red Sox homer to quip last week, "If Ned Yost managed the 2004 Red Sox, I'd be in an insane asylum right now."  Overall, Yost did an okay job in the World Series, save for a couple of tardy pitching changes and a senseless double switch in San Francisco.  

Despite an above average managing job in October, Yost's failure to recognize the opportunity to pinch-run for Alex Gordon in the bottom of the ninth in game seven warrants discussion, as I've seen virtually none in all of the Kansas City postmortems.  In a nutshell, Yost should have pinch-run Terrance Gore (or even Jarrod Dyson) for Gordon in the bottom of the ninth in order to give the Royals the best chance of scoring the tying run.  Both Gore and Dyson have blazing speed; with Gore's being unlike any other active player in the majors.  

Before we get to the tactical reasons for pinch-running for Gordon, just think about it more generally: It's the bottom of the ninth, two outs, game seven of the World Series, down by one with a runner on third.  If you are the team trailing (like the Royals on Wednesday) this is the ultimate "gonzo" situation in baseball.  The situation is so extreme, so unlikely, that even nine year-old boys invoke it whenever they want an excuse to act irresponsibly during backyard baseball games.  Put simply, the runner on third has to find a way to score, and Yost, as the Royals manager, had to pull every lever at his disposal to try to score him.  

So Yost should have pinch-run one of Kansas City's speedsters for Alex Gordon, preferably Terrance Gore.  Why?  To steal home?  Not necessarily, although, a legitimate attempt and close play would immediately be placed on the Mount Rushmore of unforgettable postseason baseball moments.  Add to that Yost's immediate elevation from "dumbest man in baseball" to "riverboat gambler who I'd love to play for," one could see why an attempt to steal home is attractive.  

Setting aside the theatrics of a (likely unsuccessful) attempt to steal home, there are two concrete reasons why Gore or Dyson should have pinch-run for Gordon in the bottom of the ninth on Wednesday.  First and somewhat obviously, in a passed ball situation, Gore, with blazing speed, stands a much better chance of scoring than Gordon, who, while a smart baserunner, has merely "decent" speed.  

Second, and most importantly, Yost should have recognized the opportunity to break-up Bumgarner's rhythm and to get into the head of the eventual World Series MVP.  Remember, it's a once-in-a-lifetime game situation.  If Yost pulls one of his most reliable offensive and defensive players out of the game in order to place one of Kansas City's notorious speedsters 90 feet from home plate in the bottom of the ninth in game seven, Bumgarner and Giants catcher Buster Posey have to wonder what may be coming.  (This is to say nothing of near earthquake of excitement that would have shaken Kauffman Stadium had the desperate crowd witnessed Terrance Gore take his place at third base.) After all, as the Royals have taught us all, "that's what speed do."  

If Bumgarner, as a lefty, is pitching from the stretch, his back is to third base.  With blazing speed leading off of third base in the most stressful situation the game of baseball has to offer, it is not only reasonable to think Bumgarner may be slightly distracted, it's more probable than not.  After all, Bumgarner would have to think about the following: 1)  how, if at all, he would attempt to keep the runner close third; 2) he would have to think about his slide-step and speed to the plate, given the possibility (however remote) that Gore would try to steal home; and 3)  Bumgarner would have to think about not throwing a pitch that could result in a passed ball.  The last concern is important, because it very well may result in a pitch that is slightly more "hittable" than Bumgarner would normally throw.  Even if only a couple of inches off where Posey sets up, that could be the difference between jamming Perez to pop-out and end the game, and Perez getting enough of the ball to punch it over the second baseman's head to score the go-ahead run.  In short, blazing speed at third would have forced Bumgarner to pitch more defensively, even if only a little.  Baseball is a game of inches.  Literally.  With a visibly gassed Gordon at third, Bumgarner was able to simply focus on the the batter, and he did.

Some may argue that removing Alex Gordon, a gold-glove left fielder with a solid approach at the plate from game seven of the World Series is nuts.  But that's the wrong way to think about it.  Gordon played eight and two-thirds innings of game seven.  If the Royals don't score the runner on third, there's no more game seven for Alex Gordon to miss.  After all, it's better to face extra innings in game seven with a chance to win sans Gordon, than to face an off-season of blog posts like this one."

A .500 Team?

After a pretty good weekend which saw the hometown club win 3 out of 4 against divisional rival Kansas City, the Twins are now 33-45 and 8.5 games behind the division-leading Chicago White Sox. The Twins' record still doesn't look pretty, but I'm here to tell you that it's not as bad as it looks. Since May 1st, the Twins have gone 27-29 thanks in large part to an offensive that has been out-producing some pretty horrible starting pitching.

Aside from Joe Mauer, the offensive production has come from a couple of unexpected performers in the likes of Josh "Hammer" Willingham and Trevor "Plouffda" Plouffe who both seem to have made it their mission to lead the team in homeruns this year. In yesterday's game against KC, both Willingham and Plouffe went deep and Trevor managed to have the upper hand at the end of the day, hitting two bombs in a 10-8 Twins' win. On the scorecard, Plouffe leads the team in HRs with 18 and Willingham is one back at 17 (Morneau is a distant 3rd place with 10 homeruns so far this season). In only 59 games so far this season, Plouffe has managed to rack up 31 RBI and 35 Runs and has asserted himself in the middle of what has become a very formidable lineup for the Twins. The 3, 4, 5, and 6 hitters for the Twins are Mauer (.324/.414/.445) and then some combination of Willingham, Morneau, Plouffe and Doumit, all of whom bring some thunder (or at least the potential for it) to the plate with them.

Getting back to the pitching; after owning an MLB-worst 5.64 team ERA in April, the staff as a whole has been slowly improving. In May the team ERA dropped to 4.96 and in June it dropped again to a mildly respectable 4.33 mark. Twins' starters have improved quite a bit as well. After posting a miserable 6.75 ERA in April, they posted a 5.74 mark in May and improved again in June with a 5.09 ERA collectively. A 5.00+ ERA is still pretty brutal, but at least they are moving in the right direction. It's possible that the Twins could get Carl Pavano back towards the middle or end of this month and I have a feeling that Nick Blackburn will begin to figure out his issues and start to pitch better as well. It would be hard to get much worse than his current 7.74 ERA...

With 4 teams ahead of them in the standings, it's impossible HIGHLY unlikely that the Twins will be contending for anything come September, but I think that over their past 50+ games, the Twins have shown that they are at least capable of competing on a night-in, night-out basis. It's been good to see some of the youngsters like Plouffe, Scott Diamond, Cole DeVries and Ben Revere step up. The result has been much more watchable than last year's 99-loss team and gives me a little more hope going forward. The only thing I hope this recent success doesn't lead to is hesitation on the part of the front-office to make the trades they need to make. Despite being "only" 8.5 games back in the standings, the Twins still need to be sellers and with players like Span, Willingham, and Liriano performing well of late, the team has some decent trade-bait to dangle out there.